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Thomas R. Ulshafer, 8.8., Ph.D. 
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St. Mary's Seminary and University 
Baltimore, Maryland 
In the November 1990 issue of this journal, Fr. William F. Maestri published a 
provocative article entitled "Abortion in Louisiana: Passion Over Prudence." As 
the title implies, this article is an evaluation of the recent failure of a majority of 
Louisiana legislators, supported by the Catholic Church, to impose legal 
restrictions on the practice of abortion in that state. Maestri believes that the basic 
cause of their failure was "the ideal being misused in the service of destroying the 
possible."l In other words: 
Clearly the Catholic bishops in Louisiana wanted the most restrictive law possible. Lost 
in the desire to secure the most restrictive abortion law was the deeper challenge of 
fashioning a prudent law.2 
Later in the article, he explains what fashioning such a prudent law would 
require: 
True pro-life politicians must be prudent in building solid, secure coalitions which favor 
protection of the unborn. This coalition building means compromise and a willingness to 
write legislation which falls short of the ideal in hopes of attaining the possible.3 
The context for these remarks was created by the Webster decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court on July 3, 1989. Many hoped that this decision would create "a 
window of opportunity"4 which would allow the states to impose legal 
restrictions on abortion. But judging from more recent experience, including 
what seems to have happened in Louisiana and elsewhere, this has turned out to 
be a difficult task which may, at times, trouble the consciences of pro-life 
legislators, policy makers and even citizens at large. In addressing this situation, 
Maestri has produced a very timely article, one that deserves further attention. 
And so one of the goals of this article will be to advance the discussion he began 
by discussing the nature of prudent compromise in the post-Webster era. 
In reading what follows, it is important to avoid three potential 
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misinterpretations. First, this should not be construed as further commentary on 
what happened in Louisiana. Rather the effort here is to show how traditional 
Catholic theology would assess certain aspects of the politics of abortion in 
general. Second, the article does not pretend to give a complete analysis of the 
relationship between ethics and politics. Rather the objective here is to defend the 
notion that traditional Catholic moral theology would support "coalition 
building through compromise" or "prudent compromise" when these phrases are 
understood in a certain way. Finally, there will be no systematic treatment of the 
fidelity of the Catholic politician to Church authority. But it might be noted at the 
outset that if prudence is the virtue of the legislator, as St. Thomas taught,S a 
principal feature of prudence is docilitas, or "teachableness."6 
After showing that political compromise is not a simple notion, this article will 
summarize some aspects of traditional Catholic thought on legislative ethics and 
suggest how that thought might apply to the issue of political compromise in the 
post-Webster era. 
1. Two Notions of Compromise 
Reginald W. Kaufmann once captured a common sentiment in the following 
remark: "Compromise is never anything but an ignoble truce between the duty of 
a man and the terror of a coward." In the same vein, John Langan, S.J., has 
written that compromise can mean: 
A splitting of the difference between justice and injustice in a given situation; it can lead 
us to treat two poles of opinion or two sides of a dispute on an artificially equal basis; it 
can signal a comfortable acceptance of evils that really could be changed7 
These authors remind us that the word compromise often implies destructive or 
immoral activity. But many hold that to act in defense of basic human rights 
should be to act in a "principled" way and avoid making compromises, however 
personallyadvantageous.s 
Politicians have sometimes been identified with this sort of compromise, a fact 
that has helped to create what philosophers have called, after the title of one of 
Jean-Paul Sartre's plays, "the problem of dirty hands."9 This problem is founded 
on the belief that one cannot exercise political power effectively and yet remain 
morally good or innocent. 
In the 16th century, for example, Niccolo Machiavelli advised rulers that they 
must be ready to trespass against accepted moral norms if they wished to 
maintain themselves in power. 10 If he were alive today, he might advise politicans 
that since pleasing their constituencies and following their consciences sometimes 
conflict, they must always be ready to make compromises, i.e., to violate their 
consciences, in order to get elected and/ or reelected. A more sophisticated piece 
of advice might be to profess two contradictory and independent "moralities," 
one to direct their private affairs and another to shape their stances on public 
policy.ll In either case, however, they would have to accept the belief that, on 
some level, one cannot remain morally good and still be politically effective. 
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It seems that it is just this sort of compromise that the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops criticized in 1989 when they said, "No Catholic can 
responsibly take a 'pro-choice' stand when the 'choice' in question involves the 
taking of human life."12 And obviously this is not the sort of compromise which 
Maestri was advocating in his article. When he endorsed fashioning prudent law 
through compromise, he did not mean that law should be designed to serve 
political expediency. Furthermore, few politicians would admit that political 
expediency is the basis of their stance on abortion legislation. 
For the remainder of this article, this sort of compromise for the sake of 
political expediency will be designated "Compromise A," and we will see that 
traditional Catholic legislative ethics strove mightily to avoid it. 
There is, however, a second usage of the word compromise that has quite 
positive connotations in the popular mind. According to its first definition in 
most dictionaries, compromise is a method of settling differences by making 
mutual concessions. This can be a productive way to resolve conflicts between 
individuals or groups. For example, imagine that there are several qualified 
candidates seeking a political party's nomination for office, but the party 
contains two large factions, each with its own favorite candidate but neither 
with enough votes to gain the nomination. In this kind of situation, factions 
sometimes compromise on one of the other candidates. Thus a confrontation 
which might create division within the party and even leave the party without a 
nominee is resolved in a way that both maintains party unity and produces a 
viable candidate. As some organizational theorists might characterize this 
solution, through compromise a "zero-sums" game becomes a "win-win" 
proposition. 
From the perspective of any single member of either faction, such a choice 
"falls short of the ideal in hopes of obtaining the possible." That is, it appears 
that the very best candidate failed to get the nomination, but at least the party 
was able to settle on a good one. Traditional Catholic moral theology could 
bless this decision as long as the compromise candidate was qualified for 
office. 13 
This kind of neat political solution will be designated "Compromise B." 
Some have argued that compromise of this sort is inevitable and is at the very 
core of political process in a pluralistic society. 14 Since by definition pluralism 
includes diversity in "personal preferences," politicians must be ready to make 
such compromises and often have to be satisfied with incremental change. After 
all, as they say, politics is the art of the possible! 
But despite its obvious appeal, from a moral point of view, Compromise B is 
not automatically justifiable. In the post- Webster era, in particular, the choices 
confronting the pro-life legislator are not so often between good and better but 
between bad and worse, i.e., between a law that still allows a significant number 
of abortions and one that allows even more. In this context, as Prof. Leslie 
Griffin has pointed out, "The perplexing issue becomes whether or not there are 
criteria or norms by which one can distinguish good compromises from bad."15 
To develop such criteria, it is necessary to examine more carefuIly some of the 
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tasks which confront the legislator or policy maker and to offer some traditional 
Catholic perspectives on the moral issues involved, particularly regarding the 
issue of compromise. 
2. Legislation and Compromise 
The Catholic tradition has long held that the task of the legislator is a noble 
task and that the primary purpose of civil law itself is to promote virtue and the 
public welfare. St. Thomas, who did so much to shape that tradition, held that 
the authority to make laws in society was established by the will of the Creator 
and did not come about as a result of sin. 16 He also taught that the more 
powerful the officeholder, the more the officeholder needs to be virtuous, not 
only to resist temptations, but also because one cannot instill in others what one 
does not haveP 
But despite this optimism, St. Thomas did not equate civil law with morality, 
or crime with sin. 18 It is true that he did hold that a civil law is valid andjust only 
ifit is consistent with natural law, i.e., with moral principle. But not all which is 
immoral should be prohibited by civil law because civil law works under 
limitations which can fail to constrain moral principle. For example, law is 
aimed primarily at controlling external behavior and cannot always ensure 
proper motivation.l9 And law prohibits only grave evils which "the average 
man can avoid."20 
Thomas Gilbey, O.P., once summed up as follows: 
Legality ... was limited to what was expedient for the political community, that is to the 
outward acts of certain virtues ... the mode of virtue lay outside the scope of positive 
law . . . Not impatient with common weaknesses, restrained in moral indignation, the 
ruler should accept human nature as it is, knowing that people's habits cannot suddenly 
be changed by legislation.21 
Here, it may be asked, are we already dealing with a potential criteria for 
justifying some political compromises? That is, the very process of legislation 
sometimes forces the legislator to "depart from" moral principle in order to 
address the actual conditions of society, to bridge the gap between the ideal and 
the possible. Perhaps it is this kind of legal realism that some public officials 
believe they are embracing when they advocate a dual morality on the abortion 
issue. For example, a legislator might claim not to support a particular legal 
prohibition of abortion (despite personal reservations) because it would 
demand too much of women or because there is not enough public consensus to 
support the proposed law. 
But further analysis ofthe traditional Catholic thinking on the relationship of 
law to morality would raise serious questions about this use of the tradition. 
First, although the law cannot be expected to prohibit everything that is morally 
wrong, at least it should prohibit the infringement of human rights. And what 
right is more fundamental than the right to life?22 Second, while laws must have 
a measure of public support if they are to succeed, "naturalla w theorists would 
never have admitted that law is merely the expression of the . standards 
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of a particular group or society."23 As in the case of modern civil rights 
legislation, should not good law mold or strengthen consensus? 
Moreover, it is really helpful to consider the legislator's task here as having 
anything to do with compromising in the first place? Rather it seems that the 
task should be interpreted only as applying truths from one sphere of life, the 
personal, to another sphere, the social, an application which must respect the 
peculiar nature of society and of the norms which can govern it effectively.24 
Here the Thomistic notion of prudence is relevant, particularly that kind of 
political prudence known as "regnative" prudence. As St. Thomas saw it, 
prudence in general helps the agent make the right decision about the morality 
of a specific action under consideration, or guides the agent in applying general 
moral principles to cases in all their concreteness and complexity. Prudence, he 
said, "has to do with contingent human doings."25 It is soundness of judgment in 
such matters. 
Now there is a particular form of this virtue that guides public authorities in 
what St. Thomas calls the "master art" oflegislation, seeing to it that a given law 
is really at the service of the common good. This form of prudence is called 
"regnative" and it is the highest form of prudence.26 Just as the validity of any 
moral judgment is dependent upon an accurate reading of the circumstances, so 
the applicability or even the soundness of a given law can be affected by 
particular social conditions. For example, in making laws, "A person cannot be 
guided only by norms which are simply and of necessity true, he must also 
appreciate what happens in the majority of cases [ut in pluribus]. "27 In short, the 
prudent legislator knows that he or she cannot envision every conceivable set of 
circumstances in which a particular law might be invoked. 
So it turns out that the very process of making laws is not only not a form of 
compromise (although it can lead to compromises of all sorts) but is actually the 
exercise of a moral virtue. That is, prudence adapts moral principle to the 
specific work of civil law, and as St. Thomas advised us,just because civil law 
cannot do everything, the "something it does do should not be disapproved 
of. "28 
But we have not yet completely eliminated the possibility that in some 
circumstances, the process of making laws may include a version of 
Compromise A, particularly when the legislator chooses not to forbid certain 
immoral practices in society. To rule out this possibility, it is necessary to 
explain in more detail how "the possible," i.e., "the legal," contends with the 
problem of evil. For as Abraham Lincoln once reminded us: 
14 
There are few things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost everything, especially of 
government policy, is an inseparable compound of the two.2' 
3. Toleration and Compromise 
In his treatment of legislation and political prudence, St. Thomas 
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discussed the issue of evil many times. For example, he noted that specific laws 
can backfire; they can accidentally cause evils greater than those which they 
aspire to prohibit.30 Moreover, he noted, "It happens at times that some precept 
that is for people's benefit in most cases is not helpful for this particular person or 
in this particular case either because it stops something better from happening or 
because it brings in some evil."3l These are merely the observations of an 
experienced student of politics but what might sound something like a kind of 
Compromise A is his statement, "In human government, the authorities rightly 
tolerate certain evils lest certain goods be impeded or greater evils be 
incurred."32 To interpret this passage correctly, it is necessary to review some 
history. 
In 1954, Pope Pius XII endorsed and explained this teaching in a widely 
quoted address.33 He begain in an "uncompromising" tone: "No human 
authority, no state, no community of states, whatever be their religious 
character, can give a positive authorization to teach or to do that which would 
be contrary to religious truth or moral good." But he went on to qualify that 
statement by saying, the proposition that "religious and moral errors must 
always be impeded, when it is possible, because toleration of them is in itself 
immoral, is not valid absolutely and unconditionally. "Rather, he concluded: 
The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot therefore be an ultimate norm 
of action. It must be subordinate to higher and more general norms, which in some 
circumstances permit, and even perhaps seem to indicate as the better policy toleration 
of error in order to promote a greater good 
Thus in certain circumstances, legislators are justified in not prohibiting a 
particular social evil if foregoing such a prohibition is necessary in order to 
promote a greater social good. 
A. Religious Toleration 
Although the principle of toleration is not particularly hard to understand, it 
can be very hard to apply, especially in dealing with the toleration of moral evil. 
Before addressing this difficulty, it might be helpful to outline briefly the careful 
use ofthis principle by Fr. Francis Connell in his justification for the toleration 
of religious diversity prior to the "Declaration on Religious Freedom" of 
Vatican 11.34 Connell began by repeating the teaching that the Roman Catholic 
Church "is the only religious society entitled to exist ... and all men have the 
obligation to be numbered among its members." For this reason, ideally civil 
law should favor the true Church. 
However, the fact is, Connell continued, that there is religious pluralism in 
America and in many other places, and it is not the duty of the state to impose 
Catholicism on the consciences of non-believers. Consequently, "for the sake of 
securing some great good or of preventing some evil . . . there can be 
circumstances ... in which it is the more prudent course for the civil rulers, even 
of a Catholic country, to grant equal rights and full freedom of worship 
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to all religions." Although he made it clear that he deemed these rights and 
freedoms not as "real" but as "purely subjective, "he did consider the rights in 
question to be legally binding since he argued that even a Catholic president 
would have to accept them. Archbishop Karl Alter described well this kind of 
uncompromising compromise when he wrote in 1960: 
There are two kinds of religious tolerance: the one civil, which means equality before 
the law; the other doctrinal, which means one religion is as good as another - even 
when they are contradictory. The Catholic Church subscribes wholeheartedly to civil 
tolerance, but rejects so-called doctrinal tolerance.3S 
Some features of this theology of religious toleration should be highlighted. 
First, religious toleration is not considered to be an instance of Compromise A, 
i.e., a denial of firm convictions of conscience. Second, toleration is presented 
as the work of prudence, and so it is really only an aspect of the process of 
legislating. Third, toleration is not wholly passive in that rulers "may grant" 
certain rights to non-believers.36 And fourthly, an adequate reason for 
toleration can be to a void greater evils and/or to obtain greater goods. More on 
this below. 
B. Toleration and "The Many Faces of AIDS" 
As was mentioned above, the principle oftoleration seems more difficult to 
apply to those cases where "moral evil" is the primary concern (as it may be, of 
course, in compromises over abortion). It is useful to recall especially the storm 
of controversy spawned by the "The Many Faces of AIDS," the statement of 
the Administrative Board ofthe USCC which was published December 1987. 
As everyone knows by now, the controversy swirled around the correct 
interpretation of these two sentences: 
In such situations, education efforts, if grounded in the broader moral vision outlined 
above, could include accurate information about prophylactic devices. 
This has been the appropriate forum [the forum of a doctor-patient or a similar 
relationship 1 for such advice because the health care profession is concerned with both 
the well-being of the individual and public healthY 
Before summarizing the relevant parts of this controversy, it would be good 
to begin with an important observation by Fr. Michael Place: 
In the response to the administrative board's AIDS statement, no one seems to argue 
seriously against the principle of toleration of evil. Rather, they criticize its application 
to two areas of the statement. 38 
For our purposes, the main criticisms of the application were two. First, 
more than one critic argued that the principle was applied to the wrong agent, 
i.e., it should have been applied to the state, not to the Church.39 And second, 
some critics said that the principle itself was being used incorrectly, i.e., it was 
used to justify the promotion or advocacy of evil and not the mere toleration of 
it.40 
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Let us begin with this last criticism. There is some reason to agree with Fr. 
James Keenan that the toleration principle as traditionally formulated was 
intended to allow only the passive permission of, not the active furtherance of an 
evil.41 He notes that Pope Leo XIII said that the civil ruler who rightly tolerates 
evil imitates the Ruler of the universe in only permitting some evils to go 
un punished. 42 
But in either case, does not the traditional formulation also insist that the 
principle of toleration only applies to one who has the power to prevent error or 
evil in the first place? And so Keenan also seems to be correct when he suggests 
that the one who allows evil to happen, when he or she has the power to prevent 
it, is in some sense actually furthering the evil and thereby making some sort of 
compromise. 
Nevertheless, traditional Catholic thought seems to hold that this fact does 
not mean that the state necessarily does wrong to practice such toleration; when 
a sufficient reason is present - when toleration is necessary to obtain a greater 
good or avoid a greater evil- the state does not have a duty to suppress the evil. 
This may be another way to say what Pope Pius XII meant when he said that a 
higher norm takes precedence in some cases. 
And secondly, we come to the other criticism ofthe statement, namely that 
the principle of toleration was being applied to the wrong agent, namely to the 
Church. It is important to make two comments on this. On the one hand, it is 
true that the principle, again as classically formulated, applies only to the state or 
to the ruler. But is not the classical wording merely a specification of a more 
basic and universal moral principle, namely that when faced with only bad 
alternatives, one would be well advised to avoid choosing the greater evil?43 
In the second place, this criticism indirectly underlines the fact that public 
statements on complex issues related to public policy are easily misinterpreted. 
As an editorial in America put it, "Even such cautious statements are liable to be 
distorted and misunderstood, as evidenced by the front page headline of the 
Dec. 11 New York Times: 'u.s. Bishops Back Condom Education as a Move on 
AIDS."'44 Such misinterpretation construes the application of the principle of 
toleration as an instance of Compromise A. And so, as Prof. Edward Sunshine 
has pointed out, "Though often absent from public discussions, scandal is a key 
factor in official church considerations for determining whether there is 
sufficient reason to tolerate evil."45 
So it seems that the following conclusions are warranted. First, the principle 
oftoleration, as usually interpreted, allows the state to permit the perpetration of 
certain evils only when that is unavoidable and, in the words of Pius XII, is done 
in order "to promote a greater good." That is, the duty of the state to repress evil 
is not an absolute moral requirement. Second, such toleration should not be 
construed as an example of Compromise A. In Compromise A the agent 
violates his/her conscience for the sake of expediency or promote certain 
desirable outcomes. But despite the fact that acts of toleration are easily 
misconstrued, justifiable toleration is not a violation of conscience; rather it is 
obedience to "higher and more general norms" (again, the words of Pius XII). 
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Third, the classical doctrine of toleration, especially in regard to moral evils, 
stops short of endorsing any positive actions which will, willingly or 
unwillingly, promote or further those evils. This limitation leads us to search for 
another moral framework that can deal more effectively with some ofthe moral 
ambiguities generated by the Webster decision. 
4. Cooperation and Compromise 
There is such a framework in traditional Catholic legislative ethics. It consists 
in a series of principles regulating "cooperation in evil" (cooperatio ad malum). 
It might be helpful to begin with a brief summary of standard traditional 
teaching on the morality of cooperating in evil in general.46 Bernard Haering 
once defined cooperation in this way: "Cooperation in the sin of another, in 
general, is any and every physical or moral assistance in the commission of a 
sinful action in union with others."47 Now the one who participates can be a 
co-conspirator, one who consents to the evil which is being done, or else the 
participant can be an unwilling accomplice, one who personally dissents from 
the evil being done. The former kind of complicity is called "formal" and is the 
kind of cooperation with evil which should not be made.48 The latter kind is 
called "material" and is the kind of cooperation which may be justifiable under 
certain conditions. This distinction recalls the debate over a 1974 video tape 
that documented Patty Hearst's involvement in a bank robbery by the 
Simbianese Liberation Army: did she participate while approving the robbery 
(formal cooperation) or was she an unwilling victim, there out offear or mental 
confusion (material cooperation)? 
For our purposes it is necessary to focus on several of the distinctions used to 
assess cases of material cooperation. First, material cooperation is "positive" 
(or "direct," to use the terminology of St. Thomas49) when the assistance 
consists of the performance of an action on the part of the cooperator. It is 
"negative" (or "indirect") when the help offered is by way offailing to impede 
the evil when one has a duty to do so. To cite a current example, an abused wife 
can materially cooperate in her own beating either by fetching a blunt 
instrument when ordered to do so or by failing to call the police when abuse was 
imminent. 
Second, material cooperation can be "immediate" when one participates 
directly in the evil action itself or "mediate" when one is somewhat removed 
from the action. Although not all authors agreed on this point,50 immediate 
material cooperation, when fully immediate, was usually considered virtually 
or implicitly formal and was not permitted. For example, my poisoning 
someone at the orders of a mafia boss would not be justified even though I was 
forced to commit murder and even though the boss would probably be 
considered the principal agent in the crime. But my selling drugs or chemicals in 
a public pharmacy would not necessarily be considered wrong even if I was 
aware that someone with evil intent might misuse them to murder someone 
(mediate). 
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Since the only way to avoid all cooperation would be to withdraw from 
society altogether, the key questions were two. First, is my action good or 
indifferent, i.e., was it clearly not evil for some other reason? And second, do I 
have a sufficient, or proportionate reason for doing what I am doing? 
Finally, a number of other distinctions were made in the course of 
explaining the notion of material cooperation. The two most important were: 
the involvement could be either proximate (close) or remote (distant); it could 
be either necessary (indispensable) or contingent (easily replaceable). But 
these distinctions function like the ones already explained. That is: 
There are reasons which justify material cooperation, which may even suggest and 
advise it, if they do not go so far as to oblige it. These reasons must be the more valid 
and weighty the greater the evil to which our actions are perverted, the more 
proximate our contribution or cooperation in the sinful action of others, the more 
certain that our work will really be misused or perverted, the more probable that our 
refusal to cooperate could prevent the sin. and, finally, the greater the danger of 
scandal to others.51 
In light of this summary, it is possible to develop the connection between 
material cooperation and compromise. In the recent article cited above, 
Keenan moved the discussion in this direction by applying the theory of 
cooperation to the debate over "The Many Faces of AIDS." To justify this 
move, he gave some examples of how the theory of cooperation was applied 
traditionally to several other issues affecting the common good. 52 It is possible, 
however, to strengthen his case by adding a review of traditional Catholic 
teaching about voting. At the same time, this review can serve to link foregoing 
discussion of cooperation more clearly to the issue of political compromise in 
the post- Webster era. 
But first, a presupposition must be stated. Since in a democracy, the people 
rule in a real, if indirect way, what was taught about the morality of voting by 
the public was also applicable, mutatis mutandis, to voting by their 
representatives. Moreover, what was said about the election of candidates was 
also applicable, again mutatis mutandis, to voting for bills. 
It is necessary to begin our review by considering, in general, the basis for the 
obligation to vote. In a classic article published 50 years ago, John Schwarz 
wrote: "Nearly all the moralists who have considered this point agree that 
voting belongs to legal justice." That is, the citizen is obligated to vote by virtue 
of his or her duty to promote the common good.53 According to Frs. John A. 
Ryan and Francis Boland: 
Citizens are bound to promote the common good in all reasonable ways. The 
franchise enables them to further or to hinder the common wealth greatly and 
fundamentally, inasmuch as the quality of the government depends upon the kind of 
officials they elect. 54 
If a citizen acts on this obligation, what moral principles might be used to 
guide a specific vote? In 1840, the U.S. Catholic bishops put the first duty of the 
voter this way: 
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Reflect that you are accountable not only to society but to God, for the honest 
independent and fearless exercise of your own franchise, that it is a trust confided to you 
not for your private gain but for the public good, and that if yielding to any undue 
influence you act either through favor, affection, or the motives of dishonest gain 
against your own deliberative view of what will promote your country's good, you 
have violated your trust, you have betrayed your conscience, and you are a renegade to 
your country. 55 
This teaching clearly forbad voters to resort to Compromise A. And the 
following comment made by a student of the tradition makes it clear that formal 
cooperation in evil was being forbidden also: 
The responsibility of voting comes from the fact that balloters are considered to 
approve the principles of those for whom they vote and that they in a way cooperate in 
all the evils that their elected candidates carry out against Church and state. 56 
Second, there were traditional guidelines for abstaining from voting 
altogether. Given the moral obligation to vote and the possibility that an 
abstention might be read as assent,S7 normally only a serious reason would 
excuse a voter from participating in an election. According to Tanquerey, for 
example: 
A slight cause will relieve the citizen from the obligation of voting only when he is 
morally certain that he cannot affect the immediate result. Even then, he ought to take 
part in the election to show good example, and to hasten the day when the cause which 
he supports will command a majority of the voters. 58 
Therefore, as Schwarz held, "It must not be forgotten, either, that cooperation 
can be said to be negative as well as positive; thus a citizen may rightly be said to 
cooperate in the election of an unworthy candidate if without a sufficient reason 
he neglects to cast his vote."S9 
There were, however, some qualifications to these guidelines. That is, it was 
generally taught that there were times when one was required to abstain from 
voting. Two important examples of this would be the following. First, if an 
election were set up as a device to secure legitimacy for an unjust and tyrannical 
government or for an unjust policy, it would be right to abstain.60 Second, the 
magisterium could require Catholics to abstain from a vote when it sensed that 
the vital interests of the Church would be served by non-participation.61 
Third, what about those difficult situations where all the options are bad? 
Again Schwarz gave a good summary of traditional teaching. After pointing out 
that both St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Robert Bellarmine believed that anarchy 
can be worse than an evil ruler, he continued: 
20 
It is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate if there be a cause proportionate to the 
evil that would be done and the good that would be lost if the unworthy candidate is 
elected. This is considering the act of voting for an unworthy candidate in itself and 
does not involve such things as the scandal that may result, the encouragement that may 
thereby be given to evil candidates and the discouragement to good candidates, and the 
influence it may have on others' votes. If any of these elements are present, the excusing 
cause will have to be proportionately greater. It is quite evident, of course, that to vote 
for a candidate in order that he do evil is unlawful, for this is formal cooperation in 
viJ 63 e . 
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Then he added, "it is not only lawful but may be obligatory to vote for an 
unworthy candidate, even one who will inflict grave injury on Church or state if 
elected, provided it is necessary to do so in order to prevent the election of a 
candidate who is even more evil."63 
In saying this, of course, he made it clear that he supported the widely held 
opinion that voting is not an intrinsically evil act. Therefore, it was assumed that 
voting would not be an implicit form of formal cooperation with evil or be 
morally objectionable on other grounds. 
5. Compromise and Cooperation in the Post- Webster Era 
The material just discussed seems to have at least three very important 
implications for pro-life politics in the post- Webster era. First, the language of 
cooperation is clearly the most apt traditional language for evaluating the most 
perplexing compromises facing many pro-life politicians and voters, often the 
more difficult cases of Compromise B. This language is particularly apt for these 
reasons: it has a solid track record in evaluating choices directly affecting the 
common good, it clearly distinguishes those choices which are examples of 
formal cooperation (Compromise A) from those which are instances of material 
cooperation (justified Compromise B), and it does not force the Catholic 
politician or voter to opt out of the political process when great good can be 
done or evil avoided.64 
Second, using this approach, it seems possible to give some specific guidance 
to pro-life politicians. Cardinal John O'Connor, for example, seemed to be 
relying on a version of this approach when he wrote recently that voting for 
"imperfect" legislation to protect the unborn is not necessarily morally 
unacceptable. It depends upon the circumstances. The Cardinal wrote: 
It certainly seems to me, however, that in cases in which perfect legislation is clearly 
impossible, it is morally acceptable to support a pro-life bill, however reluctantly, that 
contains exceptions [e.g., abortion in the case of incest] if the following conditions 
prevail: 
. A) There is no other feasible bill restricting existing permissive abortion laws 
to a greater degree than the proposed bill. 
B) The proposed bill is more restrictive than existing law, that is, the bill does 
not weaken the current law's restraint on abortion. And, 
C) The proposed bill does not negate the responsibility of future more 
restricti ve laws. 
In addition, it would have to be made clear that we do not believe that a bill which 
contains exceptions is ideal and that we would continue to urge future legislation which 
would more fully protect human life.6s 
Third, using the concept of negative cooperation, a case might be made that in 
some circumstances it is obligatory to vote for imperfect or compromise 
legislation. An example of such a case might be when an abstention would serve 
to further the less perfect of two or more imperfect alternatives. Though this 
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point needs further discussion, one might use this traditional concept to argue 
that to abstain when that choice will enable the more harmful bill to pass is to act 
against both charity and justice.66 
Conclusion 
In discussing how traditional Catholic moral theology might approach the 
issue of political compromise, this article has dealt with only one small aspect of 
a complex ethical issue. Fr. Maestri would rightly remind us of the importance 
of issues like the need for cultural analysis and for a view of the mission of the 
Church in the world.67 But at this point in time, what he calls "the legislative 
challenge" seems to be very urgent, namely how to utilize the window of 
opportunity afforded by Webster to extend effective legal protection to the 
unborn. 
This article began by referring to Maestri's rejection of the misuse of the ideal 
in the service of destroying the possible and his advocacy of coalition building 
through willingness to compromise. Hopefully this review of traditional 
thinking has contributed to a clearer understanding of just what these 
expressions might mean and how certain kinds of compromise might be 
defended. 
Although compromise is a bad word in the minds of many people, 
willingness to employ Compromise B, at least in some situations, is a necessary 
condition for political effectiveness in a democracy. The challenge is to make 
such compromises without falling into moral insincerity (Compromise A) or 
formal complicity with evil. Though some might tackle this challenge by 
employing the classical notion of prudent legislation or the principle of 
toleration, we have seen that such a route is somewhat problematic. Rather this 
article has recommended the theory of justified material cooperation as the most 
productive and time-honored course to follow. This amounts to a pursuit of "the 
possible" and, in light of how law is made today, is certainly also a work of 
political prudence. 
In conclusion, then, it appears that traditional Catholic thought would say 
that with a sufficient reason and in a certain concrete situation where there is no 
other viable way to limit the harm being done by a law, one should not 
necessarily be ashamed to work out a compromise with those who support an 
imperfect, non-ideal proposal. And in some cases one may even have an 
obligation to do so. 
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